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INTRODUCTION: 
THE LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGIC SURPRISE THEORY 
During the years following the Second World War, intensive research was undertaken on the subject of 
response to threat. Confronted with the baffling, yet recurrent inability of nations to respond adequately to 
warnings of an impending attack, many scholars concentrated on such events as the Pearl Harbor attack, the 
Barbarossa Operation, and the outbreak of the Korean War, and produced a voluminous body of literature. 
Alongside the plethora of works which sought explanations solely in terms of the specific conditions 
operating at the time of the event analyzed, a few other inquiries attempted to integrate the case under 
scrutiny into a broader theoretical framework in order to better elucidate the inherent patterns by which 
nations cope with situations of crisis and threat.1 On the whole, the literature dealing with the failure of 
national actors to stand up to the challenge of an imminent assault can be divided into two major categories, 
which differ widely from one another in terms of the explicit and implicit premises, the specific nature of the 
explanation advanced, and the level of abstraction. These may be termed the analytic-revisionist and the 
cognitive-perceptual categories.2
In most of their basic premises, analytical-revisionist studies comprise an extension of the logic of the 
rational theory of decision. Convinced that actions taken by national actors reflect purpose or intention, and 
are chosen “'as a calculated solution to a strategic problem,"3 proponents of this approach assume that 
statesmen accurately perceive external threats and opportunities, and select policies on the basis of a cost-
benefit calculus in order to advance the national interest.4 Committed to the notion of rationality (albeit in the 
sense of provocative action), which implies consistent, value-maximizing choice, this research category 
generally ignores the possibility of chance, lack of coordination, unintended consequences and 
coincidences. Instead, it suspects that "well-laid plans give events a coherence they would otherwise lack,"5 
and that hidden manipulation and conspiracies, rather than confusion and chaos, are the factors responsible 
for the failure of national actors to meet the challenge of an impending onslaught. Specifically, analytic-
revisionist interpretations of the Pearl Harbor attack, the outbreak of the Korean War and the Yom Kippur 
War argue that the initiator did not in the least surprise the leadership of the “victim state.” Rather. the 
attacker merely reacted to a deliberate posture on the part of the "victim," who provoked the confrontation 
as a carefully thought-out means of maximizing a broad cluster of desired goals, whose importance far 
outweighed the losses anticipated in the course of the conflagration.6 The analytic-revisionist category of 
research therefore rejects the concept of surprise as an authentic, spontaneous phenomenon. Perceiving the 
outbreak of war as the culmination of an elaborate scheme, intended to goad the enemy into firing the first 
shot, this approach directly challenges the orthodox interpretation of such events as the Pearl Harbor attack, 
the outbreak of the Korean War and the beginning of the Yom Kippur War.7
Whereas the analytic-revisionist category of research is predisposed to downgrade or obfuscate any 
conceptual, cultural, or communication impediments to a timely and accurate diagnosis of an immediate 
onslaught, works which rely largely on cognitive premises as their basic analytical tool are largely skeptical 
about the prospects for fully overcoming the problems of confusion, ambiguity and deception. Seeking an 
explanation in terms of the perceptual mechanisms and predispositions which obscured the relevant warning 
signals gathered by the "victim state," these studies maintain that "the possibility of surprise at any time lies 
in the conditions of human perception and steins from uncertainties so basic that they are not likely to be 
eliminated, though they might be reduced."8 As a result of this innate propensity to see ambiguous 
information as confirming preexisting images and beliefs "about how the world works and what patterns it is 
likely to present us with."9 policy makers are bound — according to this category — to distort or dismiss as 
unreliable and unfounded, information which is incompatible with initial beliefs, particularly those which 
comprise the core of their belief systems.10 Given the welter of obstacles to accurate and timely threat 
perception "that are both profound and numerous, and therefore also practically insurmountable." strategic 
surprises are depicted by representatives of the cognitive orientation not as the exception but rather the rule 
— "practically every strategic surprise attempt is said to succeed."11 
In the same way that the analytic-revisionist literature can be divided into several subcategories, which 
differ from one another both in terms of the specific interpretation pursued and the extent to which they 
accept the premises of the analytic-revisionist model.12 so do various cognitive interpretations diverge in 
terms of emphasis, focus and nuance. They include: Alexander George's and Richard Smoke's analysis of 
the reward-cost implications of correct and timely signal detection, which originate in a specific policy 
background; Robert Jervis' review of an entire cluster of motivated (rather than purely cognitive) biases 
affecting threat perception; Raymond Cohen's emphasis on the dangers of misperception, which are 
inherent in the encounter between low-context and high-context cultures; Richard Ned Lebow's findings 
regarding the domestic sources of brinkmanship: and Barbara Farnham's focus on such components of 
prospect theory as frame change. These are but a few of the efforts to integrate cognitive premises and 
concepts into a differentiated and sophisticated explanation of the roots of human behavior on the eve of 
and during acute international crises.13
In assessing the contribution of these two research categories in explaining cases of inadequate 
response to threat, it is evident that analytic-revisionist studies reduce the complexity of human behavior in 
crisis situations to a monistic unity. In so doing, they establish distorted stereotypes of the political actor and 
of the nature of political processes. Committed to the belief that catastrophes such as Pearl Harbor, the 
Korean War and the Yom Kippur attack did not result from genuine intelligence failures but were rather the 
outcome of deliberate provocations designed to entice the opponent to strike, analytic-revisionist 
interpretations greatly overestimate the human capacity to initiate, plan and manipulate. These studies ignore 
the fact that political actors do not function in a social, political, cultural and psychological vacuum, but are 
continuously confronted with a plethora of constraints which may well restrict their freedom of action and 
margin of maneuverability.14
Turning to the evaluation of cognitive-perceptual explanations, it appears that at least some of them 
underestimate the human capacity to deviate from preexisting cognitive constraints, and thus to adopt 
policies which are incompatible with preconceived images and beliefs. Thus, whereas analytic-revisionist 
studies overestimate the human capability to control the operational environment, some (albeit not all) 
cognitive-perceptual works underestimate the ability of decision-making units to overcome the obfuscating 
screen of ambiguity, noise and deception. and thus to predicate their crisis behavior upon the dynamics of the 
unfolding situation rather than on the premises of certain fixed belief systems.15 In other words, for all the 
efforts to proceed beyond the single distinction between "signals" and "noise” and thus to analyze the origins 
of surprise in a highly differentiated manner, this research category has been preoccupied with the cognitive, 
political and strategic sources of misperception of the opponent's intentions. It has remained at least 
partially oblivious to the cluster of constraints, problems and difficulties (including cognitive and doctrinal 
biases and barriers), which may arise after the adversary's basic intentions had been accurately perceived and 
diagnosed by the "victim state" and after the initial barriers to receptivity had been completely overcome.16 
Notwithstanding their insightful efforts to incorporate concepts and analytical tools from attribution theory 
and schema theory. and to differentiate between distinctive levels of rationality in the processing of new and 
discrepant information, the cognitive-perceptual “school" has paid insufficient attention to the multitude of 
cognitive, political, strategic and bureaucratic factors and constraints which may intervene between threat 
perception and response, and which may doom the prospects of effectively responding to the threat of the 
approaching attack.17 The existence of this intervening phase between threat perception and response 
therefore implies that threat perception may remain decoupled from any concrete and timely action when 
decision makers are convinced that it is unnecessary to resort to certain emergency measures to counter the 
imminent danger. It further entails the possibility that even when policy makers do perceive a threat and 
believe some response to be feasible, desirable and necessary, unpreparedness may still be the final 
outcome:18
We should not play down the magnitude or severity of the difficulties standing in the way of 
accurate threat perception, nor should we succumb to the common fallacy of blaming every 
failure to respond effectively on unwillingness to recognize the existence of a threat. Diverse 
'legitimate" as well as illegitimate' inputs, some completely beyond one's control and others 
having little to do with surprise, influence the response process and may dramatically affect its 
output and the ultimate outcome.19
As a step toward further differentiation not only between divergent sources of misperception, but also 
between the distinct phases of threat perception and response, the following analysis will focus on the case 
of the Yom Kippur War of October 1973. Using the recently declassified Agranat Commission Report as a 
major historical source, I believe that this sequential review of the factors and variables which intervene 
between threat perception and response will help explain at least some of the remaining anomalies and 
paradoxes associated with the outbreak of the war. In addition, it may provide the impetus for more 
comprehensive and comparative research on the types of linkage between perception and action. 
CASE STUDY: THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, 1973 
Israeli Perceptions of Arab Intentions 
In order to systematically reconstruct the perceptual and behavioral patterns by which members of the 
Israeli political and military leadership attempted to cope with the welter of tactical indicators, which 
increasingly warned of an impending attack on Israel by both Egypt and Syria, it is essential to scrutinize 
carefully the two major determinants of expectations about future adversarial behavior that pertain to the 
opponents' intentions and capabilities. Although it is widely assumed that intention assessment, which is 
believed to be intrinsically fraught with ambiguities and ambivalence, is considerably more difficult than 
capability assessment, which is at least partially based on hard evidence (which is relatively easy to 
obtain),20 one should not overlook the broad complex of intangible capability components and dimensions 
that are particularly susceptible to misperception.21 These include: the enemy's motivation and morale: the 
quality of their military intelligence, control systems and communications; the nature of the prevailing 
military doctrine; and their ability to absorb and effectively employ new and sophisticated weapon 
systems.22
Intention assessment may be divided into two sub-categories: first, perceptions of the adversary's basic 
intentions; and second, perceptions of the adversary's immediate intentions.23 The former are perceptions of 
the opponent's general behavioral style, approach to calculating political action, motivational calculus and 
ideology.24 Altogether, these components comprise a coherent set of beliefs and expectations concerning the 
opponent's operational code, frame of reference, and overall cultural and conceptual frameworks.23 The 
second subcategory are perceptions of the opponent's anticipated short-term behavior. Whereas perceptions of 
the adversary's basic intentions represent the potential and the desired, perceptions of the adversary's 
immediate intentions represent the tangible and the operational, with the initiator prepared to act forthwith in 
order to promote their basic objectives and thus to convert the hypothetical into the actual and observable.26
Most of the works that seek to elucidate the origins of surprise focus on the opponent's intentions 
(both basic and immediate) as the central independent variable and as the main determinant which 
precipitated complacency and lack of preparedness in the face of the approaching attack. However, it 
appears that within the Arab-Israeli sphere intention assessment did not comprise the main source of 
misperception and miscalculation. Instead, the main factor responsible for the inadequate Israeli response to 
the clearly perceived threat of war was the continued inability of Israel's military leaders (and its intelligence 
establishment) to update their assessments of the adversary's military capabilities during the period 
preceding the Yom Kippur War. Thus, while perceptions of the enemy's immediate intentions were revised 
and updated in view of the accumulating tactical indicators of the approaching war, no such change took place 
in the Israeli perceptions of Arab capabilities, which remained largely outdated and depreciatory.27 Indeed, in 
applying these concepts and distinctions to the context of the Yom Kippur case, it is clear that during the 
period immediately preceding the outbreak of war, the basic strategic preconception — previously adhered 
to by most Israeli decision makers and high-ranking military officers — that Syria (or Egypt) would not 
resort to war unless it could secure control of the skies, gradually and incrementally receded into the 
background (particularly with regard to the northern front) in the face of the accumulating complex of 
tactical indicators which increasingly warned of an impending attack. 
During the years and months that preceded the war, Israeli leaders were predisposed to perceive basic 
Arab intentions as divorced from their immediate intentions. For example, while Defense Minister Moshe 
Dayan repeatedly reiterated (in April, May, July and early September 1973) his belief that Arab frustration 
with the status quo might ultimately lead Egypt and Syria to embark on a confrontational course vis-a-vis 
Israel, this assessment remained — at least until late September — general, amorphous and long-term, and 
as such did not entail any immediate and operational ramifications for Israel. 
As the defense minister observed, in his statement of 17 April 1973, to the Northern Command: 
The period during which the Arabs hoped to pursue the diplomatic option as a means of 
recovering the territories lost in the Six-Day War has ended, and they started to play for and 
think of a new era of hostilities ... I think that it is safe to say that Egypt, Libya and Syria have 
embarked on a collision course with Israel.28
Similarly, in his address of 22 May 1973, to the Parliamentary Foreign and Defense Committee, Dayan 
pointed out: "Egypt believes that the status quo cannot be maintained indefinitely, and that it is preferable 
[for Egypt] to renew hostilities regardless of the consequences rather than accept the status quo."29
Finally, in his meeting with the editors of Israel's major newspapers, the defense minister once again 
alluded to the danger of war, which was inherent in a continued diplomatic stalemate (combined with 
Egypt's adamant refusal to accept the territorial status quo). The nature of the potential challenge, and the 
Arab timetable for resorting to military operations remained, however, fraught with ambiguity and 
permeated with uncertainty: "The Arabs are intensifying now their efforts to mobilize such resources as oil . . 
.. It is entirely possible that this endeavor will entail not only words but specific deeds."30
For all its salience and durability, this perception of the Arab threat as middle-range or long-term 
(which was predicated upon the premise that Egypt and Syria would not attack Israel unless they achieved 
the capability to strike Israel's centers of population), was progressively abandoned by several (albeit not all) 
members of Israel's political and military elite on the eve of war. Thus, although the Israeli leadership 
continued to estimate — until the outbreak of hostilities — that it could maintain its perceived air 
superiority into the mid-1970s, this assessment became decoupled from the growing recognition that Egypt 
and Syria had made a strategic decision to go to war despite the high risks involved. Notwithstanding the 
innate human propensity to remain fully committed to preconceived beliefs and images in the face of 
discrepant information, such policy makers as Defense Minister Dayan became increasingly predisposed to set 
aside their long-standing strategic assumptions and expectations during the period immediately preceding the 
war as a result of their direct encounter with a broad cluster of tactical indicators which — particularly in the 
Syrian zone — portrayed a picture of imminent war.31
Alongside this growing propensity to differentiate between the strategic and the tactical, a new 
symbiosis between two hitherto distinctive perceptions clearly emerged on the eve of war. With the basic 
and long-term transformed and converted into the immediate and concrete, the gap between the potential and 
the actual finally disappeared. 
Some military leaders, such as Major General Eli Zeira (the director of the Israeli Military Intelligence 
— AMAN), continued to believe that the opponent's recognition of its own inadequate military capabilities 
would ultimately outweigh and mitigate the desire to challenge the status quo and thus dictate a restrained 
Arab posture. Defense Minister Dayan, on the other hand, became increasingly convinced that an Arab 
decision to initiate war could well be reached even in a perceived asymmetric military context. He felt that 
the perception of insufficient capabilities by no means comprised an unbridgeable barrier to the Arab 
margin of maneuverability and latitude of choice in seeking to dramatically alter the strategic regional 
environment. 
Believing that Arab frustration with the continued status quo and diplomatic deadlock might dictate a 
recalcitrant, defiant posture despite an overall military inferiority, Dayan ultimately assigned priority in his 
strategic assessment of the unfolding crisis to considerations and factors related to Arab intentions over those 
pertaining to their capabilities. It is to the analysis of this conviction, which became the source of Israel's 
defense posture on the eve of war, that this article now turns. 
Changing Israeli Threat Perceptions 
An analysis of the process by which the threat of an imminent Egyptian and Syrian attack came to 
permeate the thinking of Israel's decision makers, thus overshadowing the preexisting perception of the Arab 
threat as a long-term and diffuse contingency, reveals an asymmetry between the northern and southern 
fronts. Whereas, in the Golan Heights, the screens of deception and ambiguity completely evaporated as early 
as late September 1973, in Sinai the change was slower. There, residues of the initial perception of war as a 
long-term eventuality continued to preoccupy and distract the architects of Israel's foreign and defense 
policy up to the very eve of war. 
The initial precipitant or "'trigger event," which provided the impetus for changing Defense Minister 
Dayan's assessment of the prospects of war with Syria, was the briefing by Major General Yitzhak Hoffi 
(Commander of the Northern Command) to members of the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) general staff and the 
defense minister on 24 September. Emphasizing the fact that unlike the situation on the Egyptian front. Israel 
lacked strategic depth or any natural barrier in the Golan area. Hoffi reported that Syrian armored forces 
were massing on the border at an unprecedented rate. Equally unprecedented, he further pointed out, were 
the surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, which were deployed along the border.12 Reacting to Hoffi's 
report. Dayan — who expressed concern in view of the threat to the Golan Heights' settlements — instructed 
the general staff to assess the possibility of a limited Syrian offensive in the Golan. This was the first 
occasion on which Israel's defense minister portrayed a very concrete and highly menacing scenario of a 
strategically vulnerable region becoming the target of a Syrian surprise attack designed to achieve limited 
territorial gains (including the seizure of a few Israeli civilian settlements) despite Damascus' perceived 
overall strategic inferiority.33 This perception of a local war in the Golan as an immediate rather than long-
range contingency was to become increasingly dominant and salient in Dayan's thinking in the aftermath of 
his visit to the Golan front, which took place on 26 September. Whereas, prior to this visit, Dayan alluded 
to the "war scenario" as one among several contingencies that he considered possible in view of the 
mounting tension along Israel's northern border, it is clear that his first-hand impressions of Israel's tactical 
vulnerabilities in the Golan, which were reinforced by additional data indicating that the Syrian buildup was 
indeed unprecedented, led him to reframe the entire regional situation. Rather than applying to the highly-
charged, emotion-laden Golan crisis his pre-conceived perceptions of the long-term strategic prerequisites for 
a full-scale war (which precluded war in 1973), the defense minister was now prepared to decouple the Syrian 
front from the Egyptian theater and thus to view a limited northern conflagration as a tangible and imminent, 
acutely menacing eventuality.34
In seeking to explore the origins of this frame change from the potential and hypothetical to the 
unfolding and impending, it appears that Dayan's perspective changed as soon as he became convinced that 
the specific pattern of Syrian behavior since late September was clearly incompatible with previous 
instances of troop reinforcements and military exercises, and could not be reconciled with any other 
contingency except offensive war. Indeed, the fact that at least several components of the observed Syrian 
troop concentration represented — in Dayan's eyes — a significant deviation and departure from certain tacit 
and implicit "rules of engagement'" and the patterns of recurrent behavior within the Israeli-Syrian dyad 
during the period following the 1967 war, convinced him that the rapidly developing crisis could not be 
attributed to non-threatening motives. He concluded that the pre-crisis expectation that the Arab opponent 
would not pose a comprehensive military challenge to the status quo before 1975, should now be set aside, 
at least along Israel's northern front.35 Consequently, he resolved the contradiction between attitude-toward-
situation (his belief that Egypt and Syria perceived the status quo as unacceptable) and attitude-toward-
object (his belief that Egypt and Syria were too weak to initiate general war) by assigning priority to the 
cluster of situational factors (which indicated that war was imminent) over those derived from basic images 
of the Arab opponent (which precluded war as a short-term eventuality).36 So compelling was the situation 
along the Syrian-Israeli border, that "the perceived danger of pursuing the old policy based on attitude-
toward-object" prompted the defense minister to revise his assessments regarding the likelihood of an 
immediate conflagration along the Golan border.37
In this context the element which affected Dayan's definition of the situation most profoundly, and 
which played a dominant role in the frame change he underwent in the course of the crisis, was his 
recognition (which surfaced for the first time on 26 September), that the Syrians had concentrated their SAM 
batteries at the front rather than around Damascus. Convinced that this missile deployment unequivocally 
indicated an offensive design and could not be explained in any non-threatening fashion. Dayan repeatedly 
asserted his belief that Syria sought to place the entire Golan Heights under a dense missile umbrella so as 
to provide its advancing ground and artillery units with greater freedom of action and maneuverability. 
Thus, viewing the new Syrian missile formation (which consisted of 31 batteries covering the Golan 
Heights, as compared with only one battery in January 1973) as a definitive clue to Syria's war intentions, 
the minister became highly sensitive to the dangers to Israel inherent in the approaching northern 
confrontation. With the war perceived now as a virtual certainty. Dayan — who was further alarmed by 
King Hussein's warning of an impending Arab attack on both fronts, issued in the course of his secret visit to 
Israel on 25 September — became increasingly affected by its anticipated short-term outcome.38 In 
particular, he began to demonstrate — during the last week of September — an ever increasing concern for 
the safety of the Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights. As Dayan pointed out in the course of his 1 October 
meeting with his general staff: 
On the Jordanian border we have civilian settlements but no enemy. On the Egyptian border we 
have an enemy but no settlements. On the Syrian border we have both. If the Syrians get to our 
settlements, it will be calamitous.39
Reiterating his belief that the imminent outbreak of war posed a grave danger to the highly vulnerable 
civilian population, the defense minister became preoccupied with the urgent need to strengthen the Israeli 
forces in the Golan Heights and to find ways to effectively protect the settlements. And indeed, during the 
two weeks which preceded the outbreak of war Dayan — as well as Major General Hoffi and the Chief of 
Staff Lieutenant General Elazar — were not in the least distracted or misled by any barrier of noise, ambiguity 
or deception in their assessment of Syrian intentions. While all of them remained convinced that Israel 
would ultimately take advantage of its perceived overall military superiority to prevail in the war.40 their 
attention shifted — during the fortnight which preceded the outbreak of hostilities — from overall strategic 
calculations and assessments to specific islands of vulnerability and weakness. As a result of this perceptual 
shift in the pattern by which the Golan crisis was defined and framed, several precautionary measures were 
taken in the immediate aftermath of Dayan's visit to the Syrian border to strengthen the Israeli forces in the 
Golan area. Specifically, elements of the Seventh Armored Brigade (including 25 tank crews) and some 
heavy artillery units were dispatched to the north. Concurrently, as a measure of precaution, anti-tank 
positions, ditches and mines were added and strengthened, and a higher level of alert was introduced.41 On 
3 October, after the Syrians had moved 850 tanks into jump-off positions. Dayan decided to reinforce the 
Seventh Armored Brigade. Instead of the 70 tanks in place two weeks earlier, the total reached 188 by 5 
October. On the same day, Major General Hoffi was authorized to strengthen fortifications with an increase 
of manpower, bringing them up to an average of 20 men per fortification.42
In summary, although still convinced that the overall balance of military capabilities favored Israel, 
Defense Minister Dayan (as well as Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Elazar. his deputy Major General 
Tal, and Major General Hoffi) became increasingly preoccupied with the expected costs of the impending 
war. On numerous occasions he confessed to having a "trauma" about what might happen to the settlements 
on the Golan Heights in the course of the war.43 Far from remaining complacent in the face of the signals 
which indicated that war was imminent, Dayan moved apace to strengthen Israeli forces along the northern 
border. That the precautions taken ultimately proved insufficient to instantly and comprehensively contain 
the Syrian offensive is, of course, quite a different matter. 
Turning to the southern front, it is clear that the perceptual shift from the remote and abstract to the 
immediate and concrete was sequential and phased, with the pre-existing strategic perception which ruled 
out the outbreak of general war with Egypt as a short-term eventuality only slowly and unobtrusively 
receding into the background. Unlike the situation in the Golan Heights, where war was broadly perceived 
as imminent as early as 26 September, the significance of at least some of the tactical data gathered by 
Israeli military intelligence along the southern front did not fully penetrate the screens of strategic 
preconceptions and deception until the very eve of war.44
Thus, whereas on the northern front the specific precipitant or trigger for Hoffi's and Dayan's frame 
change and subsequent decisions and actions can be traced safely to their interpretation of a single indicator 
(the specific formation of the Syrian SAM batteries), no such ironclad and early clue regarding the 
opponent's intentions emerged on the southern front. Instead, the shift in perspective and policy indications 
from the general to the concrete and immediate was, in the canal zone, of an incremental and gradual nature. 
It is true that during the week preceding the war, AMAN accumulated a broad complex of credible indicators 
concerning Egyptian activity along the Suez Canal, which deviated from certain established patterns of 
behavior in apparently similar circumstances. However, this recognition that Egypt infringed upon the tacit 
rules of the game with Israel and crossed the demarcation line between the permissible and the forbidden did 
not trigger an early and comprehensive Israeli response. To illustrate: while monitoring what had been 
initially viewed as an extensive military exercise (Tahrir 41), AMAN discerned, on 29 September, several 
unprecedented Egyptian measures and moves which were incompatible with the "exercise interpretation." 
Among other things, AMAN discovered that, unlike previous exercises, the Egyptian Army now was 
practicing division-level maneuvers with unprecedented logistic efforts supporting the largest stockpiling of 
ammunition yet reported. Concurrently, intercepted Egyptian radio communications revealed vastly 
improved field communications networks that were unwarranted for a routine military exercise.45 
Furthermore, on 1 October, an additional cluster of indicators, which could not be attributed to the exercise 
Tahrir 41 and which included detailed reports of accelerated engineering activity along the canal, reached 
Israel's Southern Command headquarters from observation posts along the Suez Canal. These reports 
indicated the clearing of mine fields along the approaches to the canal, the building of new roads, the 
preparation of areas for crossing, the deployment of pontoon bridges as well as bridging equipment to the 
canal area, and the manning of empty anti-aircraft and artillery positions.46
Notwithstanding the multitude of these early and credible indicators of the approaching Egyptian 
assault, Dayan was initially predisposed to accept the assessment of General Zeira, who interpreted 
Egyptian troop concentrations as part of an extensive exercise (which was to last until 7 October). In other 
words, in Dayan’s thinking, there was no built-in, automatic and concurrent linkage between the two fronts. 
Whereas in the Golan Heights the perception of war as an immediate eventuality came to outweigh and 
replace his preliminary strategic belief that Israel would manage to effectively deter Syria from resorting to 
military action (at least until 1975) as early as on 26 September, this perceptual shift did not instantly spill 
over to the southern front. Not until the evening of 4 October was this gap between the two fronts in terms 
of the respective assessments of the opponents’ immediate intentions fully closed. The precipitant for this 
frame change in Dayan’s perceptions of the Egyptian intentions (as well as in the perceptions of most 
members of Israel's military and political leadership) was inherent in the accumulating reports which indicated 
that Antonov-22 aircraft had arrived in Cairo (and Damascus) to evacuate the families of Soviet advisers.47
Coming in the wake of a plethora of indicators, such as aerial photographs from a special 
reconnaissance mission of the canal zone (carried out on 4 October), which revealed an unprecedented 
buildup of Egyptian forces, the news of the Soviet airlift constituted for Dayan the "'last straw" or catalyst. 
This led him to abandon his belief that war would be confined to the northern front.48 This perception of 
imminent war on both fronts was reinforced further early in the morning of 5 October, when Zvi Zamir, the 
director of the Mossad, obtained a piece of information which he considered to be most reliable and 
conclusive, which confirmed that war would break out on both fronts at sunset on 6 October. This 
information was delivered to the prime minister and the defense minister on the same day.49 And indeed, in 
a meeting which took place at the Defense Ministry on the morning of 5 October, Dayan expressed his belief 
that the ongoing military exercise in Egypt was merely a cover and a prelude for an impending attack.50
In conclusion, by the morning of 5 October, Israeli decision makers and military leaders (with the 
notable exception of the director of AMAN) had already completely abandoned the preconception which 
categorically precluded the possibility of a full-scale war in 1973. Their decisions on the very eve of war 
were therefore not in the least affected by any obfuscating noise regarding their opponents' intentions to 
strike instantly.  Faced with mounting indicators which were depicted as inextricably related to Egypt's and 
Syria's war aims and which could not be reconciled with any other interpretation, they moved to reframe the 
crisis as a matter of direct and immediate concern which called for an immediate response.31 Furthermore, 
shortly after these definitive signals had reached Prime Minister Golda Meir, she approved Dayan's 
suggestion for a partial (100,000) defensive reserve mobilization. However, General Elazar's request for 
full mobilization of combat reserves and for a preemptive air strike against Syrian airfields and missile 
emplacements was rejected by Dayan and subsequently by the prime minister. After inquiring what was 
needed for optimal defense capability, Meir authorized (less than five hours before the war broke out) a 
large-scale mobilization of forces. 
As Dayan stated in the course of an emergency meeting which took place in Prime Minister Meir's 
office on the morning of 6 October: 
I will not resign if a decision is made in favor of full mobilization. but in view of the fact that 
the war will start in the Golan Heights and on the banks of the Suez Canal, limited — purely 
defensive — measures will be initially sufficient . . .. We are not facing the same situation that 
existed in 1967.32
That these expectations, which were based on the assumption "that the regular army, supported by 
the airforce . . . could withstand a combined attack on two fronts . . . thus allowing ample time to mobilize 
the reserves . . .,"33 failed to materialize is, of course, quite a different matter and cannot be attributed to any 
misperception of the opponent's intentions. 
Israeli Perceptions of Arab Capabilities 
In seeking to elucidate the origins of this gap between accurate intention perception and inadequate 
response, the article will now shift its focus to the second major determinant of expectations about future 
adversarial behavior: capability assessment. Contrary to the widespread belief that intention assessment is 
far more difficult and complex than capability assessment, the case of the Yom Kippur War demonstrates 
just the opposite. The main impediment to an effective and timely Israeli response to the looming military 
challenge originated in static and outdated perceptions of the opponents' capabilities, rather than in 
misperception of their immediate intentions. Apparently, the relatively static cluster of attitudes pertaining to 
the Arabs' overall military capabilities and ability to fully absorb sophisticated and advanced weapon 
systems (attitude-toward-object), surfaced as a major constraint in the course of the debate as to the 
appropriate response to the impending onslaught.54
In trying to account for the discrepancy and asymmetry between these two categories, (mention 
assessment versus capability assessment) it appears that by virtue of the fact that they underwent drastic 
modifications in their structure. formation and configuration during the period immediately preceding the 
outbreak of war, indicators of the opponents' short-term intentions were susceptible to early detection and 
accurate interpretation. So drastic was the deviation from certain long-standing, well-established patterns of 
Egyptian and Syrian tactical and strategic behavior along the Israeli border, that this infringement of the 
rules of the game was quickly recognized and diagnosed by Israel as a statement of intent. Israeli decision 
makers correctly concluded that this was the prelude to the violent repudiation and disruption of the entire 
pre-existing system of intricate non-verbal communication and restraint within the Arab-Israeli 
relationship.55
By comparison, the fact that capability assessments (particularly on the strategic level) inevitably dealt 
with prolonged processes which changed only gradually and incrementally, led the Israeli leadership to fit 
new and discrepant capability indicators into their preconceived theories and images. To paraphrase Jervis, 
the contradiction between the incoming pieces of discrepant data (concerning the opponents' capabilities) and 
the prevailing view was small enough to go unnoticed or to be dismissed as unimportant.56 Whereas the 
change in some of the indicators of the opponents' immediate intentions — particularly on the northern 
front — was quite overwhelming and unequivocal and thus precipitated a major cognitive reorganization 
among most members of Israel's high policy elite, no clear-cut and conclusive criteria for updating and 
revising the opponents' capabilities emerged on the eve of war. Furthermore, the fact that capability 
assessments were inextricably related to an entire cluster of deeply-ingrained political, cultural and 
philosophical beliefs, made discrepant information particularly susceptible to the dangers of misperception, 
rejection and erroneous interpretation. Thus, in the absence of ironclad and definitive evidence (of the sort 
that was obtained with respect to the opponents' intentions) that a dramatic change in the Arabs' capabilities 
indeed took place, Israel's policy makers were predisposed to adhere tenaciously to their preexisting images 
of the opponent's overall military capabilities in defiance of all fragments of contradictory information.57 In 
this context President Sadat's decision to expel some 20,000 Soviet advisers from Egypt in July 1972, 
became a crucial indicator of Egypt's military weakness, and thus comprised a major part of a coherent 
complex of capability assessments which remained largely intact until the outbreak of war. 
As will be shown, it was this category of capability assessment that ultimately modified, mitigated, 
and softened Israeli expectations regarding the magnitude and ramifications of the impending attack. 
Comprising a cluster of intervening or "filtering" variables between the phases of intention assessment and 
response, capability assessments, which were based on an overly optimistic estimate of the balance of 
capabilities between the protagonists, ultimately outweighed and considerably neutralized the accurate 
assessments of the opponents' determination to initiate war in October 1973.58 In other words, it was this 
asymmetry between intention assessments and capability assessments which enabled Israel's policy makers 
to retain at least some of their preconceived images of their Arab opponent, but at the cost of responding 
belatedly and inadequately to the approaching challenge of war. It is to an analysis of this cluster of factors 
that counterbalanced the impact, which the timely diagnosis (particularly in the Golan Heights) of the threat 
of war might have had upon the nature and scope of Israel's response, that the article now turns. 
Whereas several key indicators of Egypt's and Syria's immediate intentions underwent a rapid and far-
reaching transformation during the week preceding 6 October 1973, the changes in the indicators of their 
military capability was considerably slower and. as such, could not erode the preconceived Israeli conviction 
that an asymmetry in military capabilities favoring Israel still existed on the eve of war. Furthermore, 
whereas intention assessment was closely patterned on the distinction between the routine and the deviant, no 
self-evident, clear-cut demarcation lines and boundaries between divergent categories and components of 
the opponents' capabilities emerged in Israel's strategic thinking during the period preceding the war. 
In assessing the Arabs' capabilities, the Israeli political and military leadership was particularly 
impressed with evidence of the Egyptian perception of its own military and political weakness. Perceived as 
an ironclad and single index of future behavior, which was inextricably related to basic dimensions and 
characteristics that could not be controlled or manipulated by Egypt,59 this evidence of the Egyptian 
evaluation of its own inferior capability vis-a-vis Israel (which was accumulated from 1971 through 1972) 
became a central and immutable component in Israel's strategic planning. Israeli planners relied heavily on 
the early assessments of the Egyptian general staff, which argued before 1973 that even a limited ground 
operation without adequate defensive capability in the air could be turned into a disastrous defeat, and which 
expressed skepticism regarding Egypt's capacity to absorb and integrate modem Soviet weaponry into its 
armed forces. The conservative Israeli general staff remained oblivious to the overall significance of 
subsequent incremental indications of change in this category. Irreversibly committed to a static and immutable 
vision of Egypt's capabilities and highly skeptical regarding its ability to effectively operate sophisticated 
weapon systems, it failed to recognize the fact that by the spring of 1973 this pessimistic Egyptian evaluation 
of the military balance had largely changed, giving way to a considerably more optimistic cluster of 
predictions regarding the likely outcome of war:60
Israel's leaders relied heavily on a stream of evidence entailing Egyptian evaluation of its own 
capabilities. Their perception was fairly accurate from 1971 through 1972, but much less so after 
Egypt began to receive enormous amounts of military equipment from the Soviet Union in the 
spring of 1973 .. .. Israel's general staff underestimated the impact of a dense antimissile system 
on the capacity of its air force to operate over the canal zone and the consequent damage that the 
Egyptian army could inflict on the standing army in the forty-eight hours of an attack.61
During the months immediately preceding the war, the Egyptian general staff's evaluation of the 
military balance had changed significantly as a result of both accelerated arms deliveries from the Soviet 
Union (which had resumed in early 1973) and the reorientation of Egypt's military strategy.62 As Stein points 
out, "the general staff was now planning a canal crossing and a ground crossing that would not exceed the 
range of a dense anti-aircraft system. Consequently, the absence of offensive capability in the air became 
considerably less important."63 The receipt in late August 1973, of SCUD missiles which could strike at 
Israel's population centers, as well as of the highly effective and mobile anti-aircraft missiles (the SAM-6, 
and the infantry-fired SAM-7) and the antitank missiles (the SAGGER and SWATTER) constituted for 
President Sadat the last precipitant. Acquiring these weapons convinced him that Egypt, though still inferior 
to Israel, had nevertheless reached the zenith of its military capability and should therefore exploit this window 
of opportunity to accomplish a set of limited military objectives as a springboard for promoting a considerably 
broader cluster of political and strategic goals.64
Although AMAN closely monitored and fully reported the Egyptian acquisition of these improved 
military capabilities, these reports could not effectively penetrate the barriers of staunchly-held 
preconceptions and beliefs, based on Egypt's early assessments of the military balance of power, which 
envisaged it as being incapable of effectively absorbing advanced weapon systems, and hence of launching a 
successful general attack across the canal before 1975. And while the situation in the north was perceived as 
somewhat different, with Syria depicted as capable of occupying Israeli civilian settlements and of securing 
temporary tactical gains in the Golan, the overall Israeli picture of the military balance on both fronts 
remained one of total asymmetry (in Israel's favor) up to the very eve of war. Indeed, the Israeli military 
leadership was fully and irrevocably committed to such notions as the belief that Israel's aerial superiority 
was of such magnitude that its air force could not only comprehensively defend Israel's entire air space in 
case of war, but concurrently provide an umbrella of effective support for ground operations during the early 
phases of any large-scale conflagration. Consequently, they remained unaware of the possibility that, 
deployed to the front, the advanced SAM-6 and SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles could well engage the Israeli 
air force to such a degree that it would not be capable of significantly contributing to the containment effort 
during the early stages of the war.65 Thus. while believing that Egypt and Syria did intend to attack Israel in 
the immediate future, Israel's political and military leaders remained confident that the perceived balance of 
power guaranteed a comprehensive victor}' for the IDF and thus approached the confrontation with relative 
equanimity. Oblivious to the fact that their opponents had acquired the necessary capabilities for launching an 
effective limited offensive, they clung on tenaciously to their initial, obsolete perceptions of the balance of 
military power, and were therefore largely preoccupied, on the very eve of war, with questions pertaining to 
the global political context rather than to the more immediate strategic setting along Israel's borders with 
Egypt and Syria.56
Against this backdrop it is clear that, on the eve of war, capability assessment — unlike intentions 
assessment — lacked components which could be used as indices conveying unequivocal and definitive 
significance. By virtue of their innate gradualism and incrementalism, assessments of adversarial 
capabilities were capable of assimilating and accommodating a broad complex of discrepant, yet fragmented 
information without having to confront head-on these incompatibilities, and thus without having to adjust or 
reorient their basic premises. And indeed, further reinforced by certain historical analogies and lessons (derived 
from such events as the Six-Day War of June 1967), the cluster of long-standing "background images" of 
the opponents' capabilities remained static and fixed until 6 October 1973.67 By comparison, while 
incorporating certain sequential and phased components, the category of intention assessment — by virtue 
of establishing clear and salient demarcation lines between the standard and the exceptional — provided the 
impetus for timely and comprehensive cognitive modifications. 
Motivated by a pervasive perception of Arab military weakness (and assuming that the territories 
occupied during the Six-Day War provided Israel with strategic depth and formed a defensive belt 
sufficient to absorb the first blow), the Israeli leadership proceeded to search for the most appropriate 
means for coping with the crisis. Furthermore, committed to a rigid and static military doctrine which was 
predicated upon the belief that the Suez Canal zone could be defended despite the perceived local military 
asymmetry favoring Egypt, Dayan and Elazar remained highly optimistic regarding the outcome of the 
approaching Arab onslaught.68
ANALYSIS 
As the preceding case study has sought to demonstrate, on the eve of war the immediate intentions of 
both Syria and Egypt were clearly diagnosed by most members of Israel's high policy and strategy elite. And 
although an asymmetry clearly existed between the northern front, where the belief in the certainty of war 
emerged early, and the southern front, where the process of perceptual change from the general and long-term 
to the concrete and immediate was considerably slower, still the pre-existing strategic, cognitive and 
political impediments to accurate intention assessment largely disappeared before the outbreak of the war. 
However, whereas intention assessment proved (particularly on the northern front) situationally easy, capability 
assessment (particularly on the southern front) proved strategically difficult. In this sphere the Israeli 
leadership remained fully committed to the belief that, despite certain initial tactical asymmetries in terms 
of troop formation and deployment favoring Syria (which the early Israeli countermeasures were designed to 
adequately address), a major strategic asymmetry in overall military capabilities between Israel and both its 
opponents continued to exist. In view of this discrepancy between the two determinants of expectations 
about future adversarial behavior, Israel's high-policy elite ultimately assigned priority to the cluster of 
capability indicators over those pertaining to Egypt's and Syria's immediate intentions.69 As a result, while the 
certainty of war was not questioned by Israel's policy makers, its threatening military ramifications were 
considerably downgraded and mitigated as a result of a set of intervening indicators of the opponents' 
capabilities. In other words, the accurate perception of the threat of war did not precipitate, in this case, an 
adequate and timely response. Indeed, with attitude-toward-object ultimately emerging as the dominant 
cognitive category, and with attitude-toward-situation receding into the background, Dayan's advocacy of 
partial mobilization became Israel's official posture on the very eve of war.70
Specifically, on the morning of 6 October 1973, Israel's decision makers were virtually certain that 
the Arabs would launch a massive attack later in the day. With all remaining doubts regarding this 
eventuality rapidly evaporating in the wake of the arrival of a conclusive and definitive warning from a 
highly reliable source, which confirmed that war on both fronts was imminent, the question which 
preoccupied Meir, Dayan and Elazar was how and when to respond to the impeding military challenge. It is 
precisely at this juncture that an entire cluster of factors, which were closely patterned on the category of 
capability assessment, came to intervene between the phases of war recognition and response, thus dictating 
a behavioral pattern which proved inadequate and insufficient. Continuing to believe that a major gap in the 
overall military capabilities favoring Israel still existed, Dayan — during the morning hours of 6 October 
— remained unwavering in his opposition to launching a preemptive air strike against Syria and to 
authorizing a large-scale mobilization of reserves. Notwithstanding his recognition that the Arab attack would 
take place before the mobilization of reserves could be completed, Dayan continued to believe that the 
military situation did not call for such a politically costly decision.71 As we have already witnessed, although 
the chief of staff repeatedly called for a preemptive strike (and a large-scale mobilization), the minister of 
defense "gave greatest weight to the international political implications of military action."72 Convinced that, 
by virtue of its superior military capabilities and secure borders (particularly in the south), Israel could absorb 
and contain the Arab attack while avoiding international condemnation (and possibly sanctions) which a 
preemptive strike was bound to precipitate, he was therefore prepared to pay a perceived marginal military 
price for securing a highly-desired set of political goals. As the defense minister pointed out a few hours 
before the outbreak of the war: 
As far as the question of 'preemptive strike' is concerned, although — operationally — it is 
preferable to attack the opponents before they launch their own attack against us, in my opinion we 
cannot [politically] afford such a measure . . . .  In principle, we cannot open fire before they open 
fire . . .. While the idea of a preemptive strike may appear most appealing, we do not face now the 
circumstances of 1967 ... I do believe that ... we should enjoy a sound international standing when 
the war starts.73
Thus, seeking to eliminate any residue of ambiguity or doubt regarding Arab responsibility for the 
war. Israel's defense minister based his decisions on a cluster of at least partially outdated assumptions of 
the overall balance of military capabilities within the Arab-Israeli dyad. Believing that the other side had 
"deep-rooted, permanent deficiencies," Dayan held that "the aerial superiority of the Israeli airforce over the 
Arabs' airforces guaranteed the failure of any Arab offensive; that no meaningful loss of ground would occur 
that could not quickly be regained; [and] that once the enemy's advance was blocked, Israeli offensive 
moves would be immediately decisive."74
In this light, it is clear that deeply-held and long-standing national images of a profound asymmetry 
in the balance of military power favoring Israel continued to permeate and shape the thinking of Israel's high-
policy elite even though the situational, operational picture on the eve of war was one of growing military 
symmetry as a result of the massive shipment to Egypt of sophisticated Soviet weapons systems in 1973.75
Indeed, the recently published reports of the intensive discussions, which took place among Israel's 
political and military leaders during the morning hours of 6 October, clearly indicate that, except for the 
director of military intelligence, they all concentrated on the question of response rather than on the prospects 
of war (which was perceived as certain and imminent). Asserting repeatedly that the post Six-Day War 
borders provided Israel with an added margin of security, Dayan remained convinced that this "'strategic 
depth" enabled Israel to take risks and confidently wait for the approaching onslaught.76 Furthermore, at her 
meeting with the American Ambassador to Israel, Kenneth Keating, which was held four hours before the 
war started, Prime Minister Meir informed the ambassador that "Israel had decided not to launch a 
preemptive strike so as to avoid any doubt — in the world and the United States — as to the identity of the 
side which fired the first shot."77 At a meeting with Dayan, the chief of staff and a few cabinet members, Meir 
strongly concurred with her defense minister, maintaining that "the world will not tolerate an Israeli 
preemptive strike."78
The decision not to preempt was confirmed in an emergency cabinet meeting that started at noon on 6 
October, and which was interrupted two hours later by the news that a full-scale attack had been launched 
by Egypt and Syria. Ultimately, while the anticipated political gains may have been achieved as a result of 
this decision, they were clearly overshadowed by what proved to be exceedingly high military, human and 
psychological costs, which had far-reaching strategic and political ramifications in the aftermath of the 
war.79
CONCLUSIONS 
The central conclusion that emerges from the foregoing analysis is the need to approach the question of 
the origins of surprise sequentially.80 Whereas most of the cognitive literature has remained preoccupied 
with the effort to identify and underscore the patterns and types of misperception that repeatedly prevented 
the "victim state" from recognizing their adversary's belligerent intentions, much less emphasis has been 
placed on subsequent cognitive (and bureaucratic) processes which help shape the actual response to the 
perceived threat of attack. Accurate intention assessment, then, should be viewed as the tip of the iceberg 
and as nothing more than the initial phase in a long and multifaceted cognitive process. Deciphering the 
opponent's intentions and immediate goals by no means guarantees, therefore, that one's response will be 
appropriate or satisfactory. Hence, attention should be paid to a variety of constraints and factors which may 
surface after the initial barriers to accurate intention assessment have been overcome, and which may 
ultimately reduce the chances of coping effectively with the anticipated assault. Surprise, then, should be 
viewed in relative rather than absolute terms, and may well be the outcome of inaccurate capability 
assessments rather than of the inability to decipher the adversary's immediate intentions. Indeed, as the 
preceding review of the Yom Kippur case sought to demonstrate, perceptions of the opponent's military 
capabilities (which were inextricably related to a wide complex of strategic, cultural and technological 
factors) proved to be the major obstacle to effective and timely response by downgrading and minimizing 
the threatening ramifications (particularly in the southern zone) of the approaching confrontation. 
And, while it is virtually impossible to completely separate the assessment of the opponent's intentions 
from the appraisal of its capabilities, since any assessment of the opponent's immediate intentions is at least 
partially based on the analysis of the specific configuration, deployment and location of its military forces, 
more attention should be given to the tactical and tangible indicators of the adversary's war-relevant actual 
behavior than to its basic strategic preconceptions, aspirations and predilections. In other words, rather than 
focusing on the general components of the military balance, the leadership of the status quo power should 
assign priority — in its effort to assess the likelihood of war — to the cluster of ingredients which pertain to 
an imminent planned action (local, partial or general), by the challenger, which may be carried out even when 
the perceived overall balance of military capabilities favors the status quo or defending state.81 Indeed, 
whether flawed (as was the case before the Yom Kippur War) or accurate, assessments of the overall military 
balance should not be viewed as the dominant index for evaluating the prospects of a limited or even general 
military action. Such a challenge may be derived from a broad cluster of political, ideological, economic, 
psychological and domestic factors, and is, therefore, only seldom predicated entirely upon purely military 
considerations. 
Although the foregoing reconstruction of the divergent patterns of perception and misperception was 
confined to one specific case study, the Yom Kippur episode should by no means be approached in purely 
idiosyncratic terms, but should provide part of the infrastructure for the development of a differentiated and 
sequential theory of threat perception and action. Additional cases in which apparently similar forms of 
misperception were evident — such as the Chinese intervention in the Korean War in November 1950, the 
Sino-Indian Border War of October 1962, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, as well as a large number of 
asymmetric low-intensity conflicts — should be reconstructed scrupulously in the hope of establishing the 
necessary empirical building blocks for the cumulative development of a typological theory of cognition 
and action in the shadow of war.82
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